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all grew and could include Kanaks (Fisher 2016). The 
New Caledonian government register of persons with 
customary status — exclusively for Kanak — is also 
inadequate since it is possible for people to revoke their 
customary status in favour of a common law status. It 
may also ignore people who might identify as Kanak 
but also as ‘Caledonian’, ‘several communities’ or ‘other’ 
in the census.
Therefore, it is difficult to quantify with any 
precision both the Kanak population and the electoral 
weight of the pro- or anti-independence camps. In 
an effort to respond to the challenges involved in any 
attempt to relate electoral results to ethnic origins, 
and while census comparisons before 2009 are limited 
owing to category changes, this paper proposes a 
geopolitical reading through an examination of 
the relationship between electoral results and the 
demographic and ethnic profiles collected at the 2009 
and 2014 censuses by the Institut de la statistique et des 
études économiques de la Nouvelle-Calédonie (ISEE, a 
government body).
Part A of this paper considers the origins, 
mechanisms and electoral sensibilities of the Kanak 
while examining the results of the elections since the 
1988 Matignon-Oudinot Accords. Part B attempts 
to determine the role of the Kanak vote in the 
forthcoming referendum on self-determination. 
Part A: The geopolitical characteristics of the 
Kanak vote
French colonial rule over New Caledonia began in 
1853 and systematically excluded the Kanak from 
political life. From 1878 to World War Two, the 
colonial administration governed through the indigénat 
regime, a series of laws enacted to keep the Kanak 
This article is a revised and updated English language 
version of ‘Le vote kanak existe-t-il?’ which appeared in 
Revue juridique politique et économique de Nouvelle-
Calédonie, no. 31, April 2018. 
Introduction
On 4 November 2018, New Caledonia will determine 
whether or not to become independent from France 
in a referendum of self-determination.1 This vote 
comes after nearly half a century of division on the 
independence question. In 1958, 98 per cent of the 
New Caledonian population voted to remain with 
France under the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. 
However, within 20 years, the large majority of Kanak 
had begun to oppose French sovereignty and demand 
independence. However, after decades of migration to 
the territory from France and other French territories, 
the Kanak had become a demographic minority in 
their own land, rendering the Kanak independence 
movement incapable of obtaining political dominance 
and winning a referendum.
Still, the Kanak population, said to be currently 39 
per cent of the territorial total in 2014, is too large to 
be ignored. Thirty-one years after the last referendum 
on independence in 1987, which was boycotted by the 
pro-independence coalition, the Front de Libération 
Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS or Kanak 
Socialist National Liberation Front), few analyses have 
considered the evolution of the Kanak electorate. The 
demographic trend and number of Kanaks themselves 
are not clear given changes in the definition of the 
ethnic category of the census from 2003; while self-
identified Kanaks totalled 39.1 per cent in 2014, the 
lowest proportion of Kanaks ever, the new post-2009 
categories of ‘Caledonian’ and ‘no declared identity’ 
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in reserves, subject to a head tax and forced labour. 
The end of the war led to reforms that saw the Kanak 
become equal citizens and, gradually from 1946 to 
1957, obtain the right to vote. Their democratic weight 
— 51.1 per cent in 1956 (Fisher 2013:107) — rendered 
them a prized electorate. Certain more conservative 
political forces sought to restrict their right to vote by 
introducing separate electorates with disproportionate 
power granted to French settlers. The large majority 
of Kanak threw their support behind the multicultural 
pro-autonomy party, Union Calédonienne (UC or 
Caledonian Union), which enjoyed political dominance 
for much of the postwar period and included both 
Europeans and Kanaks under the banner ‘two colours, 
one united people’. 
However, from the 1960s, an increasing number 
of mostly younger, educated Kanak began to challenge 
UC’s hold over the Kanak electorate, many members 
of which were influenced by anti-colonial and anti-
capitalist ideas. They challenged the nascent Kanak 
political elite, which consisted mostly of customary 
leaders and senior laymen in the Catholic and 
Protestant churches. Some of these younger Kanak 
activists, strongly influenced by Marxist ideas, formed 
the Parti de Libération Kanak (Palika or Kanak 
Liberation Party) in 1976. The UC experienced a major 
division in 1977 after younger members pushed the 
party towards a pro-independence position, resulting 
in most non-Kanak leaving the party. Both UC and 
Palika continue to dominate the pro-independence 
political landscape today. In the 1980s, conflict between 
pro- and anti-independence partisans brought the 
territory to the precipice of civil war in what is known 
as les événements (the events), aggravated further by 
a putative independence referendum in 1987 that was 
boycotted by the pro-independence groups. 
New Caledonia’s present-day political landscape has 
been shaped by two key political settlements between 
pro- and anti-independence forces: the 1988 Matignon-
Oudinot Accords and 1998 Noumea Accord. As part 
of France, New Caledonians vote for the President of 
the Republic, two members in the French national 
assembly, a senator, as well as representatives of their 
local communes (municipalities). In addition, New 
Caledonians elect their own territorial assembly, 
today known as the Congress. The Matignon-Oudinot 
Accords split the territory into three new provinces 
each with its own democratically elected assembly. 
The balance of power in the 54 seats of Congress 
corresponds proportionally to the distribution of 
seats in each of the assemblies. The result is that 
pro-independence parties have held control over the 
two Kanak-dominated provinces, the North (70 per 
cent Kanak in 2014) and the Loyalty Islands (94 per 
cent). These reflect the colonial underpinnings of 
New Caledonian society, where European settlement 
took place in Noumea in the south and small villages 
along the west coast, while Kanak reserves dominated 
the north, east and the Islands. The more populous 
South Province (which includes Noumea), where 
two-thirds of the territorial population and the large 
majority of non-Kanak live (only 26.7 per cent are 
Kanak), has remained dominated by political parties 
opposed to independence. Since the composition of the 
Congress reflects the varying size of the populations 
of the provinces, the anti-independence parties have 
maintained a majority in the assembly since 1988, 
albeit with a declining margin to the benefit of the pro-
independence parties from 1998 (Fisher 2013:157). 
Electoral List General electoral list 
(LEG)
Special electoral list for the 
provinces (LESP)
Special electoral list for the 
referendum (LESC)
Elections Presidential
Senatorial
Legislative (French 
national assembly)
Communal/municipal
European
Provincial assemblies 
and the New Caledonian 
Congress
Referendum on  
4 November 2018 on the exit 
to the Noumea Accord
Eligibility All French citizens ‘Citizens of New Caledonia’: 
French citizens with 
continuous residence in 
New Caledonia since  
8 November 1998
French citizens with 
continuous residence in New 
Caledonia from 1994 to 2014
Number of voters 188,781 160,362 174,154 (as of 1 October 2018)
Table 1: The different electorates in New Caledonia following the 1998 Noumea Accord.
Source: compiled by authors from the provisions set out under the Noumea Accord.
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Special electorates defined by conditions of duration 
of residence were introduced under the Noumea Accord 
to define, inter alia, who can participate in elections 
for the provincial assemblies and the Congress of New 
Caledonia (see Table 1). For provincial elections the 
Accord required residence of 10 years to 1998. After 
considerable disputation by pro-France forces, French 
national adjudication in 2007 confirmed the pro-
independence interpretation of ‘freezing’ the electorate at 
this 10-year requirement for the duration of the Accord 
(as opposed to the pro-France preference, after the 
Accord was signed, for 10 years to each election date). 
This provision restricts the electorate to longstanding 
residents — above all, those French citizens who arrived 
before 8 November 1998 — to vote in elections for 
the provincial assemblies and the Congress, known as 
‘New Caledonian citizens’. A separate special electorate 
with different residency requirements exists for the 
referendum (this aspect is covered further under ‘A pre-
determined referendum?’ below).
The following section looks at three principal 
factors that structure and explain the Kanak vote; 
a vote that is essentially pro-independence, often 
communitarian and influenced by custom and 
proximity, and includes an extraterritorial vote. 
An essentially pro-independence vote
The major trends of the Kanak vote in favour of 
independence underscored in this paper should 
not obscure other realities. Nevertheless, the most 
important trend is the dominance of the pro-
independence cause in this electorate. This has been 
taken by academics and commentators as self-evident. 
This article suggests, however, that the situation is more 
complex than it appears on the surface, and is the first 
attempt to explore the issues involved in more depth. 
If we correlate ISEE ethnic data across different 
census results with the results from different provincial 
elections, we can identify a strong connection between 
the distribution of the Kanak people in New Caledonia 
and the electoral distribution of the pro-independence 
vote (see Figure 1). The communes where the Kanak 
are in the majority (such as those in the north-east, 
east and the Loyalty Islands) are equally those where 
the pro-independence parties have obtained their best 
results over a period of nearly 30 years.
Although this correlation does not appear to be 
contested at the communal level, the case of Greater 
Noumea, where the largest concentrations (one-third) 
of Kanak live, raises some difficulties of interpretation. 
The area referred to as Greater Noumea incorporates 
central Noumea and the communes of Dumbéa and 
Figure 1: Correlation between the distribution of the Kanak people and the electoral distribution of the pro-independence 
vote at the 2014 provincial elections.
Source: Created by authors using data from ISEE (2009) and 2014 provincial election results.
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Mont Dore. Across Greater Noumea, we observe 
important disparities between ballot boxes, as shown in 
Figure 2 below. In the 2014 provincial elections for the 
commune of Noumea, the pro-independence parties 
obtained 11 per cent of votes, of which half came from 
the north-west of the town and more particularly 
Kaméré, Rivière Salée, Montravel and Ducos among 
others. This area is largely dominated by public housing 
where the Kanak are the majority (including the 
industrial area of Ducos, Montravel, Tindu, Nouville, 
Kaméré, Rivière Salée).
To the north-east of the city (Normandie, Fifth and 
Sixth kilometre, Magenta Aerodrome, Upper Magenta), 
in the city centre and at Nouville, the registered scores 
of pro-independence votes exceeds the communal 
average (11 per cent). However, beginning in the 
quarter of Artillerie and in every part of southern 
Noumea, votes for pro-independence parties do not 
exceed 5 per cent. By comparing this result with 
preceding provincial elections, we observe the same 
electoral fracture between the north-west and the south. 
It is equally possible to compare the ethnic 
composition of individual suburbs or urban quarters 
according to the census and their corresponding 
electoral tendency. However, this analysis is 
rendered difficult by the differences between the 
census areas used by ISEE to collect their data and 
the electoral boundaries for each ballot box. It is 
therefore impossible to compare the suburbs with 
absolute precision. Still, as Figure 2 shows, mapping 
the results after cross-checking the ethnic statistics 
and the placement of voting stations highlights the 
link between suburbs where the Kanak population 
is significant and the ballot boxes where the pro-
independence parties’ scores exceed the average of 
Greater Noumea (14.14 per cent of 2014 votes).
Figure 2: Map of the Kanak population and the pro-independence electorate in Greater Noumea. 
Source: Created by the authors using data from ISEE (2009) and 2014 provincial election results.
dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au                                                                                                 5 
DPA Discussion Paper 2018/8
The commune of Dumbéa is an exception, 
where no ballot box recorded a pro-
independence result above 20 per cent despite a 
large Kanak minority. Conversely, in Noumea, a 
dozen ballot boxes recorded above the average, 
while Mont-Dore and Païta recorded ten and 
five respectively. In the latter two cases, we 
observe important pro-independence scores 
in each of the tribu (‘tribes’ or customary land 
areas2) on urban peripheries (La Conception 
and Saint-Louis for Mont-Dore; Bangou, Saint-
Laurent, Naniouni and N’Dé for Païta).
The figures show that there is a very strong 
correlation between the principal Kanak 
suburbs and the ballot boxes with a strong pro-
independence result. However this correlation 
does not appear to be so strong with respect to 
Greater Noumea.
A close examination shows that there are numerous 
apparent discrepancies between ethnic distribution 
and the pro-independence score, especially in Greater 
Noumea (Table 2). For example, the Kanak population 
in the suburb of Nouville is in the majority (55 per cent 
according to the 2009 ISEE census). The corresponding 
voting station (Mairie 2, which includes some parts of 
the Noumea town centre), however, only scores a pro-
independence vote of 18.87 per cent, with a relatively 
weak participation rate (60 per cent compared with an 
average of 72 per cent for Noumea).
Some of the most striking examples are in the 
suburbs of Doniambo and Montravel where 75 per cent 
of inhabitants identify as Kanak. In 2014, the provincial 
elections saw the corresponding electorate score only 
48 per cent of pro-independence votes (with a 56 per 
cent participation rate). Despite a strong abstention rate, 
the statistical link is still clear even if the correlation is 
not absolute. A real disparity also exists between the 
suburbs, the population enrolled and the population 
identified in the census. For example, the number of 
enrolled individuals at the ballot box Mairie 2 only 
represents 17 per cent of the Kanak population identified 
at the census for the corresponding suburbs. This sharp 
divergence is explained later in this contribution.
In Greater Noumea, the dissonance between the 
census population, the enrolled population and the 
percentage of abstentions makes the link between the 
Kanak population and the pro-independence vote more 
uncertain. Only a broad tendency towards an ‘electoral 
preference’ can be observed.
A communitarian vote
With the end of the colonial period and the gradual 
extension of the right to vote from 1946 to 1957, the 
Kanak vote became increasingly important. The first 
Kanak political figures consisted mostly of customary 
chiefs. The first major political party formed in the 
territory, UC, emerged from two church-affilliated 
groups (one Catholic, one Protestant) which included 
both Europeans and Kanaks and provided a platform 
for a Kanak political class derived mostly from a 
customary elite. In 1953, a century after the declaration 
of French sovereignty over the territory, seven Kanak 
with the status of chiefs (or high chiefs) were elected 
to the Conseil general (the General Council) and paved 
the way for future Kanak leaders.
During this period, customary leaders strongly 
influenced the political tendencies of the Kanak. 
In the Koné region, Benoît Trépied (2010:14–18) 
described and analysed these tendencies towards a 
communitarian vote, which endured for a long time 
despite the individual liberty made possible through the 
act of voting. The political engagement of certain chiefs 
contributed to the birth of tribal or clannic ‘micro-
fiefs’, sometimes running counter to the communal 
or provincial tendencies of the majority. The electoral 
strategy of UC largely depended on a system of ‘tribal’ 
relaying of political and electoral communication.
Today, there are hardly any high or lesser chiefs 
in the electoral arena. Two recent examples contradict 
this trend however, in the Isle of Pines and Maré. Both 
islands have overwhelming Kanak populations where 
the high chiefs Hilarion Vendegou (Isle of Pines) and 
Suburbs Kanak 
population 
in the census 
(%)
Pro-independence 
results in the 
corresponding 
electoral sectors (%)
Participation 
rate (%)
Montravel and 
Doniambo
75 48 56
Tindu and Numbo 64 37 54
Nouville and 
Centre-Ville
43 19 60
Municipal average 
(territorial)
25.2 (40.3) 11.01 (41.45) 71.7 (70)
Table 2: Comparison between the Kanak census population 
(2009) and the pro-independence results (2014) in three 
sample suburbs from Noumea
Source: Compiled by authors using data from ISEE (2009) and the 2014 
provincial elections. 
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Nidoish Naisseline (Guahma district, Maré) have had a 
considerable influence on the distribution of votes. In 
the Isle of Pines (where there is one grand chefferie or 
paramount chiefly area and eight chefferies or chiefly 
areas), the superposition of customary and electoral 
territories has had a considerable influence on vote 
distribution. In contrast to almost all of the majority-
Kanak communes, which elect pro-independence 
Kanak, the high chief Hilarion Vendegou, who is 
opposed to independence, has been the elected mayor 
for most of the period since 1989. During his political 
career, he has also been elected customary senator,3 
senator (of the French Senate), and a member of 
the territorial and provincial councils. In this way, 
the superposition of two political levels (electoral 
and customary) seems in all likelihood to have 
played a considerable role in the establishment and 
reinforcement of an anti-independence Kanak area on 
this particular island. 
This link between the grand chefferie and political 
life has a double effect: it permits the high chief to 
reinforce his power in a territory and identifies a 
political party as a symbol of fidelity or deference. But 
on the other hand, it can also lead to the exacerbation 
and hardening of a political and customary divide 
with those who criticise the accumulation of powers, 
territories and governance. In the 2014 municipal 
elections, an FLNKS list succeeded in toppling the high 
chief Vendegou.
Like the Isle of Pines, Maré is a particular electoral 
example where the customary order appears to play a 
dominant role. The island, which is the most southern 
of the Loyalty Islands, has 5648 inhabitants, 97 per cent 
of whom are Kanak according to the 2014 census. 
Like the other Loyalty Islands, Maré is a quasi-integral 
customary territory (no private property or public 
lands), divided into eight districts and 30 tribes. The 
district of Guahma encompasses all of the north-west 
of the island (approximately a third of its surface) 
and includes 12 tribes representing 45 per cent of 
Maré’s population. This territorial and demographic 
supremacy adds to the customary hegemony as the 
high chief of this district is generally designated, rightly 
or wrongly, as the high chief of the territory. For nearly 
40 years (1973–2007), one man held the position of 
high chief of Guahma, the late Nidoish Naisseline,4 
founder of the moderate pro-independence party, the 
Libération Kanak Socialiste (LKS or Kanak Socialist 
Liberation). Centred in Maré, as leader of this party 
(which he virtually embodied alone), Naisseline sat 
in the Loyalty Islands provincial assembly and the 
Congress without interruption from 1989. Another LKS 
figure, Basil Citré, was mayor of Maré between 2001 
and 2014. In the 2009 provincial elections, 75 per cent 
of LKS votes came from Maré alone.
The fusion of the two political spheres is often 
considered by its detractors as a form of Kanak 
absolutism that would have been found in a precolonial 
political system of grandes chefferies in the Loyalty 
Islands. Nevertheless, these examples provoke the 
question of whether an interconnection exists between 
the customary territories and electoral territories or if 
it is a matter of exception? It might be suggested that 
customary influence is now a marginal force in Kanak 
voting patterns. Still, a closer reading of the electoral 
results at each voting station allows us to affirm that 
there are still clear inequalities in the distribution 
of votes within a single commune. How can these 
variations in the Kanak electoral vote be explained? 
Voting by proximity
Several criteria might explain the distribution, or 
rather the geographical foundation, of the Kanak vote. 
The behaviourist approach to electoral geography 
emanates largely from Anglo-Saxon researchers. The 
most well known, Kevin R. Cox, proposed a theoretical 
model explaining the spread of influences and political 
and electoral opinions (1969:81–117). This model, 
as recently adapted by Michel Bussi, will be used 
throughout this section (1998:42–43).
This approach argues that the geographical origin 
of voters, their inclusion in a tribe or a clan, continues 
to plays a considerable role in voting behaviour. In fact, 
the electoral behaviour of an area becomes accentuated 
in favour of a dominant political party (through political 
tradition, cumulative effect, clientelism, training or 
imitation to avoid marginalisation within a group), 
known as a ‘neighbourhood effect’:
We think that our vote is a free and personal act 
… Yet, as soon as you look with a bit of distance 
the sum of individual acts, an observation 
becomes clear: we do not know who our 
neighbours voted for, but we have voted like 
them (Bussi 1998:385).
Within one tribe, village or quarter, the results seem 
rather homogenous. 
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Secondly, geographic and social proximity — the 
‘friends effect’ (Bussi 1998:43) — or a customary 
proximity with the candidate, also informs the choice. 
The voters will more readily vote for someone they 
know through familial, customary or social linkages or 
by proximity to their living place. This effect generates 
a sentiment of local pride and the voter will have 
a tendency to declare their support for a candidate 
close to them in a geographic and social sense. These 
local bonds can be amplified if the candidate is a 
customary chief. This is especially notable in relation 
to the involvement of several customary chiefs in local 
political life.
Several examples permit us to illustrate this 
effect of local affinity. The results obtained by Palika 
in the North Province during the 2009 provincial 
elections are particularly significant in this way. 
The candidate at the top of the electoral list, Paul 
Néaoutyine, originally from Poindimié and the tribe 
of Saint-Michel (the Valley of Amoa), won the election 
(30.61 per cent) by obtaining his strongest result in 
Poindimié (44.95 per cent) and particularly at the 
voting station of Amoa (72.29 per cent).
In 1984, at the beginning of riots and clashes 
between Kanak and Europeans, the large part of 
pro-independence parties rallied together under the 
banner of the FLNKS, the objectives of which were to 
maximise the representation of the Kanak and pro-
independence electorate throughout the territory. 
However, this unity disguised a coalition of several 
pro-independence parties whose differences involved 
important points of tension. The most important was 
competition between Palika and UC (both members of 
the FLNKS) for hegemony over the pro-independence 
electorate. These two parties have long contested each 
other’s legitimacy as the voice of the Kanak people and 
of the pro-independence movement. Furthermore, 
since 1999, Palika and UC are both dominant in a 
particular province (the Islands for UC and the North 
for Palika) and also in various communes.
If the pro-independence electoral areas of influence 
remain largely dominated by these two parties, their 
distribution of votes reveals an important complexity 
in which the tribes, community life and clannic 
alliances seems to play a sizeable role. A cartography 
of electoral fiefs clearly emerges, sometimes within 
a single commune, which are superimposed on the 
customary geography. The customary land areas, 
historically in favour of UC or Palika, are often the 
stringent and rigorous conduits of voting preferences. 
Moreover, voting tendencies are largely influenced by 
guidance provided by customary authorities (Trépied 
2010). Despite the seeming freedom and anonymity 
provided by the right to vote, the community-based 
and customary structures continue (Muckle and 
Trépied 2010). Today, the Kanak electoral territories 
seem indissociable from the various tribes and clans, 
just as the link between them appears evident based on 
electoral patterns at voting stations.
Extra-territoriality and the growing importance of 
Kanak absentee votes (proxy voting)
Despite a demographic decline in the Islands Province 
(–4.6 per cent) and a stagnation in the North Province 
(+0.2 per cent) between 2004 and 2009, their respective 
‘special’ electorates have continued to increase, 
entrenching a gap between the electoral and census 
populations in these two largely Kanak provinces, since 
those who have moved outside their electorate retain 
their electoral residence in their commune of origin. 
Strikingly, certain communes on the east coast of the 
Grande Terre (the main island) and the Loyalty Islands 
record more voters than expected on the basis of the 
number of inhabitants, while at the territorial level only 
55 per cent of the census population was enrolled in the 
special electoral roll for provincial elections. It seems 
quite evident for the Kanak population in particular 
that their place of residence does not necessarily 
correspond to their electoral residence.
Other communes have an abnormally high 
electorate compared to the census population, such 
as certain communes on the east coast of the North 
Province (Canala, Ponérihouen, Hienghène, Ouégoa 
and Pouébo) or in the Loyalty Islands (Lifou, Ouvéa 
and Maré). If it is a matter that affects the majority 
Kanak communes, two other mainly non-Kanak 
communes in the South Province (Boulouparis and 
Moindou) also record important percentages. The 
particular case of the Loyalty Islands appears the most 
intriguing since the enrolled population easily exceeds 
the census population, even when one excludes the 
population of those under the age of 18! 
In Lifou, for example, the census population in 
2009 was 8627 inhabitants, while in the 2009 provincial 
election, 9586 people enrolled in the commune 
(that is, 111.1 per cent of the population). No voting 
station in Lifou (each of which brings together the 
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inhabitants of one or more tribes) is below the New 
Caledonian average ratio for the population percentage 
enrolled/census population (55 per cent of the census 
population). Moreover, across the whole island, this 
percentage appears remarkable when only adult 
population figures are used. According to the 2009 
census, 45 per cent of the Lifou population is under 
18 years of age. It can be estimated that in 2009, the 
census population of voting age was approximately 4745 
people, equivalent to half of the enrolled population in 
the provincial elections (9585). The situation in certain 
tribes, with the number of enrolled individuals up to 
four times the adult census population, appears even 
more surprising. This ‘grotesque’ situation extends to the 
entirety of the Loyalty Islands. 
These apparent discrepancies can be explained 
in part by the important migratory movements that 
push an increasing number of Loyalty Islanders to live 
in Greater Noumea and other urban centres rather 
than their commune or tribe of origin. When moving 
to Greater Noumea, however, often for professional, 
medical or academic reasons, the Kanak from the 
Loyalty Islands do not abandon their electoral 
residence within their tribe. This maintenance of an 
electoral residence might be explained by the need 
to keep a real and symbolic anchorage in the tribe 
to which one belongs. Yet, the majority of Loyalty 
Islanders interviewed in Greater Noumea, who all kept 
their electoral residence in their tribe of origin, note 
that they have not changed their electoral residence 
because ‘they have not necessarily considered it’. 
Others, however, admit that they have not changed 
their electoral residence primarily for ideological and 
political reasons: 
the stakes in the Loyalty Islands are not the 
same as those in the South Province and Greater 
Noumea. They feel more concerned by the 
improvement of living conditions in the Islands 
than in Noumea (Pantz 2015:148).
Today, the situation in the Islands seems to 
have passed a threshold: there are as many Loyalty 
Islander voters living in Greater Noumea as in the 
Loyalty Islands. Nevertheless, in order to continue 
to participate in the electoral debates, a section of 
‘delocalised’ voters from the Loyalty Islands have 
regularly used procurations (absentee or proxy voting). 
For several years, the number of absentee votes taken 
up in Noumea for the Islands has steadily increased, 
election after election. In the commune of Noumea, 
between the 2004 and 2009 provincial elections, the 
number of absentee votes increased by 64 per cent. 
This practice of ‘voting at a distance’ largely concerns 
the Kanak populations in the Islands and the North 
Provinces, leading to electoral manipulations and 
arousing jealousy among pro-independence parties.
The disparities noted earlier between the 
distribution of the Kanak population and the pro-
independence vote in the quarters of Greater Noumea 
appear to be explained by the important number of 
Loyalty Islanders residing in Greater Noumea who 
continue to vote in the Islands or who abstain. During 
the 43rd congress of UC in 2012 in La Foa, the pro-
independence party highlighted this tendency and 
called on ‘… the voters of the North and the Islands 
residing in the South Province to mobilise, to enrol and 
vote massively … in order to combat abstentionism’ 
(UC 2012). Moreover, for the provincial and communal 
elections, certain parties have adapted to the practice, 
while attempting to expand beyond their strongholds 
through door-knocking and phoning probable Loyalty 
Islander voters who reside outside their commune 
(principally in Greater Noumea). 
From election to election, the political parties in the 
Islands put together a network of members, partisans 
and families who work to compile a document detailing 
the names of Loyalty Islanders residing in Greater 
Noumea who would be susceptible to being called to 
vote by proxy.5 This strategy aiming to deliberately 
target and maximise the Kanak vote in Noumea, 
adopted by other parties with a presence in the Islands, 
raises numerous questions of ethnicity and democracy. 
The race for absentee votes appears to distort the 
true stakes of the provincial elections. Indeed, the 
abnormally high number of absentee votes and ‘an 
accumulation of irregularities of particularly significant 
bearing’ have already resulted in the cancellation of 
provincial elections on two occasions (1999 and 2000) 
in the Loyalty Islands by the State Council (Conseil 
d’Etat, 16 October 2009).
Part B: Approaching the referendum: an 
uncertain Kanak vote 
If the significant number of absentee votes in the 2014 
provincial election did not result in a legal battle, 
the disparity between the voting population and the 
number of absentee votes continued. In the upcoming 
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referendum, New Caledonia will be confronted with 
the same situation. On 1 October 2018, the Haut-
Commissariat de la République française (French High 
Commission6) published the definitive composition 
of the special electoral list for the referendum (or 
LESC7) which includes 174,154 voters, or 85 per cent 
of the New Caledonian population of voting age. The 
distribution of this electorate by commune confirms 
the prevalence of long-distance voting observed 
throughout the different provincial elections. In the 
Islands Province, for example, the number of people 
enrolled for the referendum has risen to 21,366 voters, 
while the ISEE estimates the population of voting age to 
be 11,500 in 2018 — a little more than half the number 
of people enrolled. 
To avoid any questioning of the future of the 
referendum, the political leaders agreed during the last 
Committee of Signatories meeting (November 2017) to 
put voting stations in place in Noumea for the Loyalty 
Islands, the Isle of Pines and Belep. On this occasion, 
it was also decided to make supporting documentation 
for absentee votes compulsory in order to prevent any 
fraud. These mechanisms have two objectives: to ensure 
the participation of the largest number of people for 
the referendum, and to limit the probability of electoral 
fraud in the Loyalty Islands. Nevertheless, it seems clear 
that the ‘vote at a distance’ is likely to have a continued 
significant impact on the referendum results. The 
solution of ‘delocalised’ voting stations in Noumea, 
introduced in order to overcome this difficulty, has 
not succeeded as planned: only a little more than 3200 
voters from the islands have taken the steps to vote in 
Noumea on 4 November.
In the next section, we will consider the historical 
power relations shaping the Kanak vote in the lead-
up to the referendum on 4 November. First, we will 
return to a major shift in New Caledonian politics that 
has occurred over a half a century, where the Kanak 
have gone from a majority to a double minority: Kanak 
and pro-independence. Then, we will examine the 
circumstance where a tendency towards particularly 
high abstention rates within the Kanak electorate 
increases uncertainty about the referendum. Lastly, we 
will try to tease out the principal difficulties and risks 
of attempting to predict the referendum result. 
The Kanak as a ‘double minority’
When the Kanak attained full French citizenship 
between 1946 (end of the Indigénat) and 1957 (the 
right to vote for all Kanak), the demographic question 
progressively acquired a political dimension as the 
balance of power between the communities evolved. 
This law of numbers has cast a shadow over New 
Caledonian political life ever since, especially as 
the majority Kanak population recorded important 
demographic growth (David, Guillaud and Pillon 
1999), yet has still been in the minority since the 1960s. 
From 1972, certain political leaders understood that 
this ‘unfavourable numerical balance’ (former Prime 
Minister of France Pierre Messmer, cited in Fisher 
2013:57) could result in a nationalist threat and could 
only be avoided if residents from metropolitan France 
or other French territories became the demographic 
majority (Fisher 2013:57) reflecting a concerted policy 
of immigration to outnumber the Kanak population. 
Electoral and census figures after 1963 demonstrate 
how the Kanak became a minority through increased 
waves of migration due to the economic boom8 
and outright conservative policies where the French 
state increasingly eroded New Caledonian political 
autonomy against the wishes of most members of 
the territorial assembly. Towards the end of the 
decade, the radicalisation of Kanak political ideology 
(Chappell 2014) and the hardening of the French state’s 
conservative position, contributed to the transition from 
an autonomy/anti-autonomy divide to one between pro- 
and anti-independence camps (Bertram 2012).
The upending of the demographic and electoral 
balance of power during this period explains 
without doubt why the Kanak did not succeed in 
attaining independence during the ‘wave of Oceanian 
independence’ between 1970 and 1980. They had 
become a ‘double minority’, that is a minority 
within the population (though still the largest single 
community) and an electoral minority. Noting 
their minority position and their inability to obtain 
independence through the ballot box, the FLNKS 
began to engage in various forms of illegal and armed 
resistance. Due to the size and loyalty of their electoral 
following, those leaders were able to demonstrate their 
legitimacy as distinct from other French citizens and 
initiate the political settlement from 1988 (Matignon-
Oudinot then the Noumea Accords). This electoral 
power equally made recourse to the United Nations and 
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international laws on the right to self-determination 
of colonised peoples and increasingly, from the 
mid-1990s, the rights of indigenous peoples to self-
determination. Still, their electoral weight fell short 
of an overall majority, provoking calls from the pro-
independence movement to restrict the electorate — a 
major element of the successive political settlements 
(see further below). As a senior French official has 
noted, it is this demographic equation and distinctive 
politics, without parallel in the rest of the world, which 
comprises the progressive institutional process of 
decolonisation (Christnacht 2008).
Kanak abstention 
The year 2017 was marked by two major French national 
elections — presidential and legislative — separated 
by several weeks, the last before the referendum on 4 
November 2018. Despite the importance of these elections, 
there was a record rate of abstention in both votes.
It must be noted that, historically, New Caledonians 
have a lower voter turnout for European and French 
elections than for their local provincial elections. The 
2017 national French elections marked the lowest 
turnout for the first and second rounds since the 1988 
Matignon-Oudinot Accords. In the 2012 presidential 
elections, the participation was 55.38 per cent in the 
first round compared to 48.14 per cent in 2017, then 
61.19 per cent in the second round compared to 
52.96 per cent in 2017. Several weeks later, the French 
legislative elections were marked by particularly low 
participation rates (48.7 per cent in the first round and 
54.8 per cent in the second).
In greater detail, in light of the method previously 
proposed, we can see that the distribution of these 
abstention rates primarily concerns the communes with 
a majority and traditionally pro-independence Kanak 
population. This Kanak abstention in French national 
elections is not new. In part it indicates a sentiment 
that French metropolitan politics are of little concern to 
everyday Kanak. However, it can also be explained by 
differences in voting advice from the different political 
parties of the FLNKS. Effectively, for these elections 
where UC had called on people not to vote, a detailed 
analysis of participation confirms this division. The 
communes and the customary land areas traditionally 
supportive of UC have largely abstained in French 
national elections.
If this abstention is not entirely surprising, 
the provincial elections, which attract far greater 
participation levels, saw their participation rate fall 
continuously since 2004 throughout New Caledonia 
and more particularly in the North Province9 and the 
Islands.10 Considering the stakes surrounding these 
key local institutions, it may be that the Noumea 
Accord, which delayed the referendum for 20 years, 
has blunted the political bipolarisation and in 
particular the pro-independence electorate (Tutugoro 
2017). This observation seems especially true for 
younger Kanak voters between 18 and 25 years old, 
less than 10 per cent of whom went to the ballot box 
during the latest elections. This decline in citizen 
engagement highlights a generational, ideological and 
identitarian fracture that seems to manifest itself at 
each election. 
It would be presumptuous to assume that this 
abstention will reoccur in the referendum, noting 
that the pro-independence camp is well aware of 
the potential of this silent electorate, with the issue 
resonating throughout their recent campaigns. More 
broadly, one of the key features of the vote will in all 
likelihood be the mobilisation of the undecided and 
abstentionist electorate. 
A pre-determined referendum?
Due to the dominance of the anti-independence parties, 
it has often been assumed by commentators that an 
anti-independence victory is almost certain. With the 
referendum electoral campaign under way, we can 
quantitatively analyse the various political forces present. 
Since the beginning of the pro-independence 
movement, the right to vote for the referendum has not 
ceased to be a critical geopolitical question between 
pro- and anti-independence supporters. From the 
early 1980s, the electoral body for the referendum has 
systematically been a point of division between the 
two political sides. However, the notion of restricting 
the electorate was long considered contrary to France’s 
principles of democratic equality and the constitutional 
principle of the ‘one and indivisible republic’. With 
the 1988 Matignon-Oudinot Accords the referendum 
was delayed until 1998. The electorate permitted to 
take part in this vote comprised those residing in the 
territory since 1988, equivalent to a period of 10 years. 
This accord delimiting the electoral body aimed to 
exclude the temporarily resident posted public servants 
dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au                                                                                                 11 
DPA Discussion Paper 2018/8
or other people with a less intimate connection to New 
Caledonia so that they could not weigh in on such a 
fundamental vote.
When the referendum was delayed to between 
2014 and 2018 under the Noumea Accord in 1998, the 
question of the electoral body for the referendum still 
remained at the heart of New Caledonian geopolitics. 
As set out in Table 1 above, there are three distinct 
electoral lists in New Caledonia as stipulated under the 
Organic Law of 19 March 1999 (which formalised the 
Noumea Accord in French domestic law): the general 
electoral list for French national elections (LEG), the 
special electoral list for the provincial elections (LES) 
and the special electoral list for the ‘consultation’ or 
referendum of self-determination (LESC). The multiple 
criteria for the LESC, which are more restrictive than 
the LES, are enumerated in Article 218 of the Organic 
Law. For example, in 2014, one must have had 20 years 
of continuous residence in New Caledonia to feature 
on the LESC, though there are other criteria apart from 
the duration of residence that permit some individuals 
to enrol.
It is the enrolment on this third list that has been at 
the heart of political debates in the months preceding 
the referendum. While some 164,000 people had 
already been enrolled in 2017 (89,000 persons with 
civil status and 75,000 with customary status (that is, 
Kanak) (Haut-Commissariat de la République française 
1/10/2018), parties claimed that cross-checking this list 
with other statistical data available revealed that several 
thousand inhabitants are not enrolled, in particular 
among the Kanak — according to these sources, 
between 10,000 and 20,000.
These individuals were a central topic of discussion 
at the Committee of Signatories meeting held in 
Paris on 2 November 2017. After many hours, an 
agreement was finally achieved in order to guarantee 
the ‘legitimacy and sincerity of the vote’. It was 
determined that ‘10 922 natives11 who reside in New 
Caledonia permanently are not enrolled on the general 
electoral list’ (Communique du Comité des Signataires, 
2 November 2017). This incorporated 7000 people 
with customary status and 4000 people with civil 
status.12 The bill modifying the Organic Law flowing 
from this Committee of Signatories will institute an 
exceptional procedure of automatic enrolment on 
the general electoral list of all French citizens living 
in New Caledonia. Then, as originally previewed in 
the Organic Law, persons of customary status will 
automatically enter on to the referendum list. The 
others will be admitted to the list if they are born in 
New Caledonia and identified as being residents for 
three years under special agreed criteria.
Table 3: Automatic enrolment on the LESC 
Before Automatic 
Enrolment
After Automatic 
Enrolment
Customary 
status
75,000 80,120
Common status 89,000 94,034
Total 164,000 174,154
Source: Compiled by the authors using data from Haut-
Commissariat de la République française (1/10/2018). 
As Table 3 shows, the ratio between the two groups 
has largely remained the same (46–54 per cent). It is 
notable, however, that whereas all those of customary 
status are Kanaks, the common status may include 
some Kanaks (see below).
Unlike in the French metropole, where the 
collection of ethnic data is strictly outlawed, the 
ISEE in New Caledonia is authorised to collect data 
pertaining to individuals’ ‘community of belonging’ due 
to the historical and political significant of demography 
(Maclellan 2010). In 2014, ISEE recorded 104,958 
Kanak, of which approximately 72,000 were of voting 
age, or 41.3 per cent of the entire LESC. Without a 
more recent census (the next occurring in 2019), the 
Kanak population can only be estimated, and on the 
assumption that population growth remains stable in 
comparison to the 2009–2014 provincial elections. 
Therefore, for 2018, the Kanak population will likely sit 
between 108,000 and 110,000 people, with 74,000–76,000 
people of voting age (between 42.5 and 43.6 per cent of 
the LESC). 
Two important factors need to be considered: 
first, the proportion of Kanak, who for one reason or 
another, are not enrolled on the LESC; second, the 
representativity of the ‘Kanak’ category in the censuses 
which, as referred to earlier, do not take into account 
those who declared themselves ‘Caledonian’, ‘several 
communities’, ‘other’ or those who did not respond to 
this question. In 2014, these three categories together 
represented 18.5 per cent of the New Caledonian 
population. However, on the basis of these figures and 
the hypothesis that at least 10 per cent of Kanak have 
common status, it is possible that Kanak form the 
majority of the LESC, which is relatively suprising given 
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the demographic history of New Caledonia as reflected 
in ISEE census figures since 2004 — and underscores 
the politicisation of ethnic data. 
Relying on electoral figures and the census data 
on ethnic belonging, which have been skewed since 
the temporary removal of the ethnic category in 2003 
and subsequent category changes (see Maclellan 2010), 
certain political leaders have not hesitated to speculate 
on the potential of this pro-independence electorate 
in order to quantify the balance of power prior to the 
vote. However, it is important to use these figures 
with caution to avoid overly simplistic and erroneous 
observations. In fact, even though there is no doubt 
the quasi-totality of persons with customary status 
is of Kanak origin, no study has measured with any 
precision the increasing Kanak presence among persons 
with common law status. 
Besides this fact of the difference of the general 
electoral body and the provincial and referendum 
electoral bodies, the demographic, statutory and 
ideological complexity of the Kanak people is a 
significant obstacle to detemining the result of the 
referendum in advance. Moreover, the most radical 
party within the independence movement, the Parti 
Travailliste (Labour Party), with two elected members 
in the New Caledonian Congress and overseen by 
Louis Kotra Uregeï, announced on 14 July 2018 that 
they would not participate in the referendum on 4 
November because it was ‘insincere’ and ‘already lost’ 
— an attitude roundly criticised by other pro- and anti-
independence parties.
A large level of abstention among young Kanak, 
as has been observed in elections for some time, 
could also play a particularly important role. Even if 
it is correct that the Kanak constitute the majority of 
enrolled persons, they may not form the majority of 
voters. Therefore, the question of mobilisation looms as 
a key factor in the referendum.
Predicting the result
New Caledonia suffers from an absence of polls on 
electoral intentions with representative samples, with 
not a single large-scale poll published in 30 years. The 
local television channel Caledonia and the polling 
institute I-Scope attempted to fill this void with a public 
poll on 12 May 2017 on New Caledonian intentions to 
vote: 54.2 per cent declared themselves to be opposed 
to independence, 24.4 per cent were favourable and 
21.4 per cent undecided. 
Unsurprisingly, this poll pointed to the correlation 
between pro-independence support and the Kanak: the 
communes in the north-east and those living in the 
tribes are generally favorable towards independence. 
However, the number of people favorable towards 
independence appears statistically equivalent to 
the number of undecided. These undecideds are 
notably ‘more numerous in the tribes, on the Loyalty 
Islands, among women, the inactive and blue-collar 
populations’ (I-Scope 2017:6–9). Nevertheless, even if the 
methodology and the sampling of this poll were validated 
by the National Polling Commission, the relatively 
restricted size of the sample (476 people), the fact that 
those sampled self-identified as eligible to vote in the 
referendum, and the high margin of error (+/– 6 per cent), 
raises questions about the validity of the poll.
Just one year after this first poll, Caledonia and the 
polling institute I-Scope conducted a second poll. This 
new poll found that 59.7 per cent of New Caledonians 
questioned would vote against independence, compared 
to 22.5 per cent in favour of ‘yes’ and 17.8 per cent 
undecided. Despite a 28 per cent increase in the 
number of respondents (608 compared to 476) and a 
result validated by the National Polling Commission, 
the sample’s scale and representativity was once again 
modest, with a large margin of error of 5 per cent. 
Despite these reservations, these two polls, which have 
the advantage of having used the same methodology 
across a comparable sample, permit a limited analysis 
of these two main tendencies and their evolution over 
time. For example, and bearing in mind margins of 
error of 5–6 per cent, at the scale of the archipelago 
we observe a decline in the number of undecided 
(–3.6 per cent) and of the ‘yes’ to independence (–1.9 
per cent) to the benefit of the ‘no’ (+5.5 per cent). In 
the mainly European South Province (75 per cent of 
the New Caledonian population), the results evolve 
in the same way (–3 for the ‘no’ against +4 points 
for the ‘yes’). In the predominantly Kanak North 
Province, if the ‘yes’ remains stable (42 per cent), the 
‘no’ has progressed (+7 points or 41 per cent) and the 
undecided declined (–7 points or 17 per cent). Lastly, 
in the predominantly Kanak Islands Province, the ‘no’ to 
independence led the ‘yes’ (49 per cent against 30 per cent 
in 2018, 44 per cent against 19 per cent in 2017). But, 
as for the rest of the survey, the scale of the sample in 
the islands (43 respondants compared with 32 in 2017) 
warrants great caution.
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Despite the poll’s limitations, the pro-
independence/Kanak correlation seems to diminish. 
Even if the communes of the north-east and those 
living in the tribes remain favourable towards 
independence, the decline of the undecideds mostly 
relates to the communes that are traditionally supportive 
of independence and Kanak-dominated, and generally 
occurs to the benfit of the ‘no’ to independence. This 
shift may be explained by the recent officialisation of 
the referendum question, its date, the visit of the prime 
minister and the launch of the referendum campaign. 
Without doubt, and as seen in other referenda of self-
determination (for example, Scotland in 2014), as the 
referendum approaches, the percentage of undecideds is 
likely to decline. 
In recent weeks, three other polls have been 
conducted: two by the Quid Novi Institute and 
a third by Caledonia/I-Scope according to the 
same methodology. These last polls confirm the 
initial research: an uncertainty that diminishes 
as the referendum approaches, and a pro/anti-
independence ratio that appears to crystallise in the 
realm of 30–40 per cent to 60–70 per cent respectively 
(Commission des Sondages 2018).
It is noteworthy that in the North and Islands 
Provinces anti-independence results have largely 
declined to the advantage of the pro-independence 
parties since 1989. In fact, in 2009 and 2014, in 
the Loyalty Islands, the anti-independence score 
obtained only 6.83 per cent and 6.89 per cent of voters 
(960 and 939 votes respectively) while in the first 
provincial elections (1989), more than 3000 Loyalty 
Islanders (more than 35 per cent) voted for the anti-
independence camp. A similar phenomenon can be 
observed (but not to the same extent) in the North 
Province where the anti-independence score declined 
from 32.1 per cent in 1989 (5410 votes) to 20 per cent 
in 2014 (4584 votes) (statistics drawn from official 
results and ISEE data). However, special circumstances 
need to be taken into account for the North Province. 
Until the late 1980s there was a significant non-Kanak 
minority (European and other) in the north of New 
Caledonia, but most of these people, under land claims 
and other pressure from the Kanak, departed the north 
and resettled in Greater Noumea.
The two political camps have a diametrically 
opposed analysis of the overall decline in the anti-
independence vote. With respect to the Loyalty 
Islands, the pro-independence leader Louis Kotra 
Uregeï interprets this phenomenon as the progression 
of the pro-independence ideology within the Kanak 
community:
There is an evolution within the Islands’ electorate. 
Progressively, there are lots of anti-independence 
people who have become pro-independence 
because there is a large majority of Kanak for 
independence. In the loyalist parties, they place 
Kanak in important posts to make people believe 
that the anti-independence parties are doing well 
among the Kanak … The majority of Kanak, the 
colonised people, refuse this situation and want 
independence (Uregeï 11/5/2014).
On the other side of politics, Simon Loueckhote, 
former anti-independence political leader who 
represented New Caledonia in the French Senate, a 
candidate in the provincial elections in the Loyalty 
Islands in 2014, and a Kanak originally from Ouvéa, 
believes that this degradation of the loyalist vote within 
the Kanak population from the North and the Islands 
derives from pro-independence parties dominating 
the exercise of government since the beginning of the 
Matignon-Oudinot Accords that succeeded in winning 
the electorate’s loyalty. He considers that:
The provincial elections are not representative of 
the progression of an ideology to the detriment of 
another and the referendum of self-determination 
alone will allow us to evaluate the extent of 
pro-independence sentiment among the Kanak 
population. I am personally persuaded that, 
when confronted with the choice between 
independence and staying within the French 
Republic, a good number of Kanak will opt for 
the latter possibility (Loueckhote 5/6/2014).13
Moreover, Loueckhote is of the view that pro-
independence sentiment is a social reality before being 
a real ideology:
It is less the pro-independence ideology than 
a social reality that has progressed. It is simply 
a fact of the times for the youth in the Islands 
to vote for independence. This is a social 
phenomenon where peer pressure is strong, 
especially among the Kanak (ibid.).
The delayed holding of a referendum, first with 
the Matignon-Oudinot Accords and subsequently with 
the Noumea Accord, has raised uncertainty about the 
evolution the pro-independence ideology among the 
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Kanak population. Does the progression of results in 
favour of pro-independence parties across the different 
provincial elections in the North or Islands correspond 
with a Kanak population that has become increasingly 
supportive of independence over time, or is it support 
for, at least familiarity with, the performance in 
government of pro-independence parties? Or is it a 
combination of these two elements? Whatever the case 
might be, this hypothesis of a Kanak electorate sensitive 
to the different institutional stakes at play contributes 
to the uncertainty of the self-determination vote.
Conclusion
Since 1946, voting rights have allowed the Kanak to go 
from an invisible to a visible political world, in terms 
of ‘modern’ electoral politics. From that moment on, 
the acquisition of the vote offered the Kanak people 
a powerful place within the New Caledonian political 
landscape, which they in turn reshaped. Through this 
electoral visibility, the Kanak took on a more combative 
stance, marking the collective consciousness in the 
form of a nationalist and pro-independence struggle.
More than 40 years after the birth of pro-
independence claims, New Caledonia is preparing to 
conclude the Accords process through a referendum 
of self-determination in 2018. Despite some clear 
trends, such as the Kanaks’ large minority status and 
their failure to hold a majority of government at the 
territorial level since 1977, the result of the referendum 
still seems uncertain.
To predict a referendum outcome is always difficult 
and recent events have proven that unexpected results 
can eventuate: most notably the Brexit referendum 
and the election of Donald Trump as President of the 
United States, both of which occurred despite polls 
predicting the contrary. To confirm or contradict the 
polls that have determined the ‘no’ vote will prove 
successful on 4 November, several variables will play a 
significant role: the percentage of the pro-independence 
vote among Kanak but equally the votes of the non-
Kanak, and the difference in participation levels 
between the Kanak and non-Kanak.
Several weeks from the vote, the definitive 
composition of the LESC (174,154 people, Haut-
Commissariat de la République française 1/10/2018) 
reveals a possible majority of Kanak among the 
enrolled, whereas the seemingly stable results of the 
different polls, albeit with qualified validity, have 
suggested a major defeat of the independence vote. 
There are also indications that an increase in the anti-
independence vote among Kanak could eventuate 
in comparison with the apparent pro-independence 
tendency in previous provincial elections. It is more 
likely than not that there may not be the same 
correlation between the Kanak and pro-independence 
votes as previously seen. On the other hand, of course, 
it is also possible that the recent electoral polls have 
been entirely wrong.
Are there other elements allowing us to doubt 
that there will be a crushing victory for the anti-
independence vote? Simon (1954) pointed to two 
principal ‘effects’ on the potential impact of a poll on a 
group. The ‘underdog effect’ plays out in favour of the 
candidate behind in the polls, whose partisans mobilise 
to overcome the deficit, while the opposite happens 
for supporters of the candidate ahead who believes 
that victory has already been achieved. In this latter 
scenario, the ‘bandwagon effect’, mobilises undecided 
voters in support of the favourite. Simon argues these 
two effects cancel each other out. It is also the case that 
no convincing study has yet shown that electoral polls 
have had a significant impact on election outcomes. 
However, it is important to note that recently, in the 
age of social media, the ‘surprises’ seem to multiply, 
recalling that in the cases of Brexit and Donald Trump, 
both causes were considered underdogs. 
What is more certain is that the rate of abstention 
will likely play a particularly significant role in the 
vote, especially for Kanak where the phenomenon has 
been most prevalent. A strong mobilisation of voters 
in the traditionally Kanak and pro-independence 
communes would be a sign of a possible resurgence 
of the pro-independence score, whereas an average or 
weak participation in these communes would diminish 
any chance of a pro-independence victory. Overall, it is 
likely that there will be a stronger participation among 
the non-Kanak than Kanak, especially among younger 
non-Kanak voters (Tutugoro 2017), with a potentially 
significant impact on the result.
With participation rates declining across successive 
elections in New Caledonia for more than a decade, 
political leaders across the spectrum need to look into 
the causes of this apparent depoliticisation, at least 
for a portion of the population. This phenomenon 
goes beyond the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to independence. 
Whatever the result of the referendum, however, the 
demographic and electoral weight of the Kanak will 
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remain an unavoidable variable in New Caledonian 
politics. Moreover, given that youth account for a high 
proportion of Kanak people, their electoral significance 
will only increase in the coming years.
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Endnotes
1. What is termed here as a ‘referendum’ is technically 
a ‘consultation’, as a referendum can only be national 
(involving all of France).
2. The term tribu refers to areas of land that were designated 
as reserves in the colonial era and, by extension, to the 
Kanak population resident therein. 
3. The Noumea Accord instituted a Customary Senate of 
sixteen members (two from each of the eight customary 
regions) to act as a consultative body on all matters 
pertaining to Kanak identity.
4. Nidoish Naisseline passed away in 2015 and his huge 
impact on New Caledonian political life was widely 
acknowledged by both sides of politics despite the 
relatively small size of the LKS political party.
5. The matter of potential proxy votes is rather sensitive 
and taboo among some political parties, notably in 
the Islands. Officially, political party leaders deny the 
existence of such documents.
6. The Haut-Commissariat de la République française 
(French High Commission) is the institution representing 
the authority of the French state in New Caledonia.
7. La liste électorale spéciale pour la consultation pour 
l’autodétermination (the special electoral list for the 
consultation for self-determination).
8. Between 1967 and 1972, a major surge in global nickel 
prices brought about what is remembered as as the ‘nickel 
boom’ in New Caledonia. This saw a significant rise in 
migration from other parts of France to New Caledonia 
and increased prosperity, but also the entrenchment and 
exacerbation of local inequality along ethnic lines.
9. 79 per cent in 2004 and 67 per cent in 2014.
10. 72 per cent in 2004 and 66 per cent in 2014.
11. People born in New Caledonia.
12. The French constitution distinguishes between persons of 
‘civil status’ under common law and those with ‘customary 
status’, enabling to varying degrees recourse to customary 
laws, customs and institutions. In New Caledonia, the 
large majority of Kanak have customary status, though 
it is possible for those born with customary status to 
renounce it in favour of civil status. New Caledonia’s 
Department of Customary Affairs retains the list of 
persons with customary status.
13. Simon Loueckhote 5/6/2014. Interview with Pierre-
Christophe Pantz, Noumea. Transcript of interview (in 
French) in possession of the author.
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